CRIMINAL LAW—PLEA BARGAINING AGREEMENTS—RIGHT TO ENFORCEMENT DERIVED FROM FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS—Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979) by Briggs, Paul
Western New England Law Review
Volume 3 3 (1980-1981)
Issue 2 Article 9
1-1-1980
CRIMINAL LAW—PLEA BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS—RIGHT TO
ENFORCEMENT DERIVED FROM FIFTH
AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS—Cooper v.
United States, 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979)
Paul Briggs
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Paul Briggs, CRIMINAL LAW—PLEA BARGAINING AGREEMENTS—RIGHT TO ENFORCEMENT DERIVED FROM FIFTH
AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS—Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979), 3 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 249 (1980),
http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol3/iss2/9
NOTES 

CRIMINAL LAW-PLEA BARGAINING AGREEMENTS--RIGHT TO 
ENFORCEMENT DERIVED FROM FIFTH AND SIXTH AMEND­
MENTs--COOper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ralph Cooper, following a narcotics arrest, became a Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) informer under the federal 
government's Witness Protection Program.! He subsequently made 
several valuable contacts for DEA agents resulting in the indict­
ments of several persons on narcotics charges. While under the 
DEA's protection, Cooper contacted one of the persons against 
whom he was to testify and offered to remove himself as a witness 
for $10,000. 2 As a result, Cooper was arrested and indicted on two 
counts of bribery of a witness3 and two counts of obstruction of 
justice. 4 
Approximately two months before Cooper's trial, an assistant 
United States attorney met with Cooper's lawyer to discuss a pos­
sible plea bargain. 5 The Government's attorney proposed a plea 
agreement under which Cooper would be removed from the Wit­
ness Protection Program, remain incarcerated, continue to 
cooperate with the federal authorities, plead guilty to one count of 
obstruction of justice, and testifY on three occasions in the ongoing 
narcotics trial. In return, the Government would bring Cooper's 
cooperation to the court's attention and would dismiss all other 
counts of the indictment. Cooper's lawyer agreed to communicate 
1. The Witness Protection Program evolved from the Organized Crime Control 
Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1976) (see note preceding § 3481) and is funded under 
28 U.S.C. § 524 (1976). The program, operated by the United States Marshals Ser­
vice, provides assistance to select government witnesses including protection, new 
identities, relocation, housing, and medical care. [1979] Arr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 
79-80. 
2. Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 13-14 (4th Cir. 1979). 
3. 18 U.S.C. § 201(e) (1976). 
4. Id. § 1503. 
5. See notes 17-28 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the plea bar­
gaining process. 
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the proposal to Cooper and to report back to the Government 
promptly. 6 
After being fully informed about the plea bargain, Cooper7 
agreed to the proposal. Meanwhile, however, the assistant United 
States attorney had met with his superior and had heen instructed 
to withdraw the proposal. Approximately three hours later, Coop­
er's attorney contacted the assistant United States attorney, but 
before he was able to convey Cooper's acceptance, the Government's 
attorney revoked the offer. 8 Cooper moved to compel enforcement 
of the plea bargain proposal at a pretrial hearing, but the motion 
was denied by the district court.9 He was convictedlO and sen­
tenced to fifteen years imprisonment. ll 
In Cooper v. United States,12 Cooper appealed the district 
court's refusal to compel enforcement of the Government's plea bar­
gain proposal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit found constitutional error, vacated the judgment, and re­
manded with instructions that Cooper be allowed to enter a guilty 
plea on one count of obstruction of justice and that all other counts 
be dismissed. 13 The court held that the Government's failure to 
honor its plea proposal violated Cooper's guarantee of substantive 
due process under the fifth amendment and denied him effective 
assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment. 14 This decision 
enforcing the Government's plea proposal on constitutional grounds 
was a substantial departure from existing precedent which uni­
6. 594 F.2d 12, 15 (4th Cir. 1979). At oral argument, the court was advised by 
Cooper's counsel that the assistant United States attorney, in making the plea pro­
posal, had represented that it would be held open for acceptance for a week. The 
record indicates a substantial concession on this point by the attorney for the Gov­
ernment. The Government's attorney testified as to the validity of the proposal on 
cross-examination at the pretrial hearing of the motion to compel enforcement of the 
plea proposal. Id. at n.2. 
7. Cooper was incarcerated during the plea offer and acceptance. Id. at 15. 
B. The assistant United States attorney had been instructed by his superior, the 
United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, to withdraw the offer. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Cooper was convicted on two counts for bribery of a witness under IB 
U.S.c. § 201(e) (1976), and on two counts for obstruction of justice under IB U.S.C. § 
1503 (1976). 
II. 594 F.2d 12, 15 (4th Cir. 1979). 
12. Id. at 12. 
13. The court of appeals determined that the defendant Cooper would be al­
lowed to enter a plea of guilty to one count of obstruction of justice under IB U.S.C. 
§ 1503 (1976), and that upon the entry of a guilty plea to the single count, the indict­
ment would be dismissed as to all remaining counts. Id. at 21. 
14. Id. at lB. 
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formly had held that plea agreements were to be analyzed using 
contract law analogies. 15 Instead, the court held that, in appro­
priate circumstances, a constitutional right to a plea proposal may 
arise even before any technical contract has been formed. 16 
II. BACKGROUND 
Plea bargaining is the disposition of criminal charges by agree­
ment between the prosecutor and the accused. 17 This process plays 
a critical role in our judicial system, accounting for the disposition 
of approximately seventy percent of all criminal cases. IS If every 
criminal charge required a full-scale trial, our state and federal 
courts would be flooded. Court facilities would have to be ex­
panded and the number of court personnel greatly increased19 to 
handle the volume of cases. 20 Without plea bargaining our system 
would be tremendously overburdened. Plea bargaining, therefore, 
is an essential part of our criminal justice system as the system is 
presently structured. 21 
Though integral to the American legal system, plea bargaining 
contrasts sharply with the traditional disposition of cases by jury 
trial. Thus, in this sense, plea bargaining has dramatically trans­
formed the criminal justice system. 22 It has shifted the criminal 
15. See notes 47-60 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the use of 
contract law analogies in the plea bargaining process. 
16. 594 F.2d at 18. 
17. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). 
18. See [1979] An. OFF. U.S. CTS., ANN. REP. 108 (Table 55) (27,295 of the 
32,913 criminal convictions in federal district courts during the 12-month period end­
ing June 30, 1979 were the result of guilty pleas and pleas of nolo contendere). Chief 
Justice Burger has stated that in the federal system alone, the number of trials would 
double if the percentage of guilty pleas decreased by just 10%. Burger, The State of 
the Judiciary, 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 931 (1970). 
19. In the 12-month period ending June 30, 1979, 33,442 criminal cases were 
terminated, amounting to a disposition~ate of 68.9%. The disposition rate is deter­
mined by combining the number of cases which have been filed or are pending and 
diViding them by the number of cases which have been terminated. [1979] An. OFF. 
U.S. CTS., ANN. REP., supra note 18, at 107. In 1979, 3,667 criminal jury trials were 
completed in the district courts, the lowest number completed since 1967. Id. Table 
59, at 114. The low disposition rate and the low number of trials completed indicate 
that the federal court system would be incapable of handling the increased trial load 
if plea bargaining were not allowed. See also Burger, supra note 18, at 929. 
20. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). 
21. Id. at 261. 
22. See generally D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT 
OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966); Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transforma­
tion of the Criminal Process, 90 HARV. L. REV. 564 (1977). 
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prosecutorial function away from the traditional model in which an 
impartial trier of fact determines guilt or innocence after a formal 
23adversarial process. Instead, plea bargaining encompasses in­
formal negotiations between the defense attorney and the prosecu­
tor to arrive at a mutually satisfactory plea and recommended sen­
tence. The plea bargaining system has eliminated many of the 
risks,24 uncertainties,25 and practical burdens26 of a trial, per­
mitting the judiciary and prosecution to concentrate their resources 
on those cases which warrant the most attention. 27 Additionally, 
law enforcement is furthered by permitting the state to exchange 
leniency in sentences for information and assistance helpful in 
prosecuting cases. 28 
United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Burger has under­
scored the importance of plea bargaining by declaring the process 
to be an essential component of the administration of justice. In 
Santobello v. New York, 29 he stated that the disposition of charges 
23. See generally Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 
34 (H. Berman ed. 1971). 
24. To the defendant, a trial appears risky and unpredictable when compared 
with the plea bargaining process. Many factors, including limited pretrial discovery, 
indetenninate questions of credibility, and the uncertainties of jury decisions, make 
the outcome of a trial unpredictable. In addition, unpredictability is often prevalent 
in sentencing procedures. Most criminal statutes grant the judge a wide and largely 
uncontrolled latitude of sentencing discretion. Plea bargaining eliminates many of 
these uncertainties by providing a predetermined charge and sentence. See Note, su­
pra note 22, at 564. 
25. Id. 
26. Among the practical burdens of a trial are costs and time. Plea bargaining 
avoids the expenses involved in a trial, expenses that in a lengthy trial may be pro­
hibitive. Plea bargaining minimizes costs and time by enabling courts to process 
cases more expeditiously than they could by hearing full trials. In federal district 
courts in 1979, the median time interval which elapsed from filing to disposition 
through a guilty plea was nine months. This figure may be compared with 14 months 
for bench trials and 15 months for jury trials. [1979] An. OFF. U.S. CTS., ANN. REP. 
supra note 18, at 115-16. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971); 
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970). 
27. State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 693, 357 A.2d 376, 381 (1976) (court hon­
ored plea bargain by allowing defendant to plead guilty to second-degree murder in 
return for dismissal of the first-degree murder charge). See also Brady v. United 
States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970) (Court rejected defendant's argument that his guilty 
plea had not been voluntarily given); People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 233-35, 318 
N.E.2d 784, 788-89, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623, 629-30 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 
(1975) (court refused to enforce plea bargained sentence upon learning of additional 
infonnation of which the pleading court was unaware at the time of defendant's 
guilty plea). 
28. State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 693, 357 A.2d 376, 381 (1976). 
29. 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971). 
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after plea discussions is an essential and desirable part of the judi­
cial process. Chief Justice Burger said that plea bargaining avoids 
the corrosive impact which the enforced idleness of pretrial con­
finement has on arrested persons, protects the public from accused 
persons prone to continue criminal conduct while on pretrial re­
lease, and enhances the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty by 
shortening the time between charge and disposition. 30 
The advantages of plea bargaining were first articulated in the 
1970 United States Supreme Court decision of Brady v. United 
States,31 the predecessor to Santobello. In holding that guilty pleas 
are not constitutionally forbidden, Brady formally approved plea 
bargaining, declaring that the plea bargaining process is inherent in 
criminal law. 32 While Brady sustained the constitutionality of plea 
bargaining, it simultaneously raised and left unanswered a number 
of important issues. Foremost is whether a defendant has a consti­
tutional right to relief from a broken plea bargain; that is, when the 
government breaches the plea agreement, whether the defendant 
has a constitutional right to have the agreement enforced. 33 Al­
though numerous lower courts34 had dealt with relief for broken 
30. Id. Despite its many advantages, plea bargaining is met with an equal 
amount of criticism. See generally Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea 
Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1180, 1314 (1975); Note, The Unconstitutionality of 
Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387 (1970). For criticism directed at specific 
problems see MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 350.3 (the need to 
regulate abuses of prosecutorial discretion); D. NEWMAN, supra note 22, at 225-26 
(the risk that innocent defendants will plead guilty); Gallagher, Judicial Participa­
tion in Plea Bargaining: A Search for New Standards, 9 HARV. C.R.-c.L. REV. 29, 
38-44 (1974) (the coercive impact of plea concessions upon the defendant); Note: 
Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286 (1972) (the sentencing irrationali­
ties of plea bargaining). 
31. 397 U.S. 742 (1970). The Supreme Court held that the defendant's guilty 
plea had been voluntarily given and that the plea had not been coerced by the death 
penalty provisions for kidnapping. 
32. Id. at 751-53. 
33. Id. 
34. See People v. Griggs, 17 Cal. 2d 621, 110 P.2d 1031 (1941) (when district 
attorney's promise of a life sentence instead of death was not fulfilled, court allowed 
withdrawal of guilty plea); People v. Fratianno, 6 Cal. App. 3d 211, 85 Cal. Rptr. 755 
(1970) (court held that plea negotiations were only to make a recommendation, not a 
promise); State v. Ashby, 43 N.J. 273, 204 A.2d 1 (1964) (court granted specific per­
formance of plea bargain); People v. Chadwick, 33 A.D.2d 687, 306 N.Y.S.2d 182 
(1969) (defendant alleged that court promised to allow him to withdraw his guilty 
plea under certain circumstances, court held promise was in effect upheld); 
Courtney v. State, 341 P.2d 610 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959) (court enforced plea bargain, 
holding that county attorney abused his discretion); Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 442 
Pa. 516, 276 A.2d 526 (1971) (prosecutor promised life instead of death in return for a 
guilty plea; court enforced promise). 
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plea agreements, the United States Supreme Court did not address 
this issue until it decided Santobello v. New YorP5 in 1971. 
In Santobello, the State of New York indicted the defendant on 
two felony counts. Subsequent plea bargain negotiations resulted 
in an agreement under which the defendant would plead guilty 
to a misdemeanor in return for dismissal of the original felony 
counts. Furthermore, the prosecutor agreed not to make a recom­
mendation as to sentence. At sentencing, a new prosecutor, igno­
rant of his colleague's commitment, recommended the maximum 
sentence, which the judge imposed. 36 The defendant's conviction 
was unanimously affirmed by the state appellate court, and the de­
fendant was denied leave to appeal to the New York State Court of 
Appeals. 37 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
determine whether the state's failure to honor the plea bargain vio­
lated the defendant's constitutional rights. 38 The Court held that 
the interests of justice and fundamental fairness required that the 
conviction be vacated and remanded to the state courts to decide 
whether to honor the plea bargain or to allow the defendant to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 39 
Santobello presented the Court with three novel issues. The 
first issue concerned whether a defendant has a constitutional right 
to relief when the government has breached a plea agreement. The 
second issue concerned identification of the source of that right in 
the Constitution. The third issue concerned what remedy would be 
allowed if that constitutional right was denied. 
Santobello emphatically answered the first question, with all 
participating Justices40 agreeing that a defendant has a constitu­
tional right to some form of remedy for a broken plea agreement. 
Santobello undisputedly held that "when a plea rests in any signifi­
cant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it 
can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such 
promise must be fulfilled. "41 Unfortunately, the Court avoided di­
35. 404 U.S. at 257. 
36. Id. at 258-60. 
37. People v. Santobello, 35 App. Div. 2d 1084,316 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1970), vacated 
and remanded sub nom., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 257. 
38. Id. at 257. 
39. Id. at 263. 
40. Justice Black and Justice Harlan did not take part in the Santobello opinion 
as a result of death and retirement, respectively. 
41. 404 U.S. at 262. 
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rect confrontation with the remaining issues. It identified neither 
the constitutional source of this right nor the appropriate remedies 
for violations. The Court's vagueness concerning the actual source 
and nature of the constitutional right to relief for broken plea 
agreements has left the lower courts without the tools to elevate 
broken plea agreements to the level of constitutional violations. 42 
Additionally, Santobello failed to provide courts with clear 
guidelines to assist them in determining what remedies are appro­
priate. 43 
The Supreme Court in Santobello indirectly alluded to the 
right to fundamental fairness embraced within the substantive due 
process guarantees of the fifth amendment. In formally approving 
the plea bargaining process, the Supreme Court stated that the 
purpose of the process was to "presuppose fairness in securing 
agreement between an accused and a prosecutor. "44 Santobello ad­
monished that plea bargaining "must be attended by safeguards to 
insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the circum­
stances. "45 Beyond these general allusions to due process guaran­
tees, the precise source of the right recognized and given protec­
tion in Santobello was not identified, but it was clear that the 
source was based on constitutional considerations. 46 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCE FOR PLEA BARGAINS 
Courts, in an attempt to fill the gap between a constitutional 
right and its source, typically have relied upon established common­
42. Westen & Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken Plea Bar­
gains, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 471, 476 (1978). 
43. A discussion of the appropriate remedies required when a broken plea bar­
gain is enforced is beyond the scope of this note. For the remedy provided to 
Cooper by the Fourth Circuit, see note 13 supra. On the issue of relief for broken 
plea agreements, see Fischer, Beyond Santobello--Remedies for Reneged Piea Bar­
gains, 2 U. SAN. FERN. V. L. REV. 121 (1973); Westen & Westin, supra note 42, at 
471; Note, The Legitimation of Plea Bargaining: Remedies for Broken Promises, 11 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 771 (1973). 
44. 404 U.S. at 261. 
45. ld. at 262. 
46. The majority opinion, written by ChiefJustice Burger, never explicitly stated 
that the decision was based on a construction of the Constitution. Santobello, how­
ever, involved a review of a state court decision with no applicable federal statute. 
ld. at 257. For the Supreme Court to have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976) 
to reverse the state court below, it must have based its decision on federal constitu­
tional grounds. Justice Douglas, concurring, specifically identified the right as consti­
tutional. ld. at 266-67. 
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law doctrines. 47 For example, in shaping the fourth amendment, 
courts have analogized to the common law of agency,48 the com­
mon law of trespass,49 and the common law of property. 50 Plea 
bargaining, in its constitutional sense, has evolved in this manner. 
Courts have identified the constitutional right to enforce a plea 
bargain but have not identified the source of this right in the Con­
stitution. Consequently, to fill the gap between the constitutional 
right to enforcement of a plea bargain and the unnamed source of 
that right, "[b]oth before and since Santobello, the courts have un­
derstandably drawn heavily on the ready analogies of substantive 
and remedial contract common law to supply the body of doctrine 
necessary to order plea bargaining practices and to afford relief to 
defendants aggrieved in the negotiating process. "51 At the same 
time, however, reliance on contract analogies was often inade­
quate. Thus, the courts were left without the means to enforce the 
broken plea bargain, and the injured defendant was left remedi­
less. 
Courts, relying upon contract law for resolving the issue of 
whether a defendant is entitled to relief for a broken plea agree­
ment, have approached their analysis as if they were interpreting 
an oral contract. 52 Thus, judicial inquiry has centered on the fac­
47. See notes 48-54 infra. 
48. People v. Stoner, 205 Cal. App. 2d 108,22 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1962), rev'd, 376 
U.S. 483 (1964). 
49. Silverman v. United States, 275 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd, 365 U.S. 
505 (1961). 
50. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960), overruled on other grounds, 
United States v. Salvucci. 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980). 
51. Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d at 15-16. 
52. "[Tlhe decision in Santobello ... involved fundamental principles of con­
tract law, notably those concerning mutually binding promises freely given in ex­
change for valid consideration." United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099, IlO9-IO 
(D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976). See also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 
U.S. 63, 75 n.6 (1977) (defendant allowed to introduce evidence of an oral promise 
by the state; Court analogized to the parol evidence rule); Palermo v. Warden, Green 
Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 295 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 431 U.S. 9Il 
(1977) (state's promise made in exchange for defendant's promise to return stolen 
property was not made while defendant was under "extreme duress"); United States 
v. Hammerman, 528 F.2d 326, 331 (4th Cir. 1975) (prosecutor's statements to the de­
fendant concerning the sentence he could expect to receive as a result of a guilty 
plea constituted a promise and was, therefore, an inducement for the defendant's 
guilty plea); United States v. Boulier, 359 F. Supp. 165, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), affd, 
476 F.2d 456, 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1086 (1973) (state's promise was not 
enforceable because the defendant did not perform his part of the bargain); Shields 
v. State, 374 A.2d 816, 818-19 (Del.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 893 (1977) (state may re­
scind its promise any time prior to the actual entry of the guilty plea by the defend­
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tual determination of' whether a plea agreement actually has been 
formed. 53 This required examination of whether the defendant and 
the government had exchanged a valid offer and acceptance. If 
they had, the courts then sought to identify the terms of the plea 
bargain. 54 Further issues raised in the plea bargaining analysis 
have included full or substantial performance and detrimental reli­
ance. 55 Finally, courts have considered whether the agreement was 
breached, and, if so, whether the breach was excused. 56 In the 
context of plea bargaining, each of these inquiries derives from the 
general law of contracts. "To the extent therefore that there has 
evolved any general body of 'plea bargain law,' it is heavily 
freighted with these contract law analogies. "57 In fact, judicial reli­
ance upon contract law analogies is exhibited in the majority of plea 
bargaining cases. 58 
The cases which result in findings that a defendant's plea bar­
gaining rights have been violated are often based upon similar fac­
tual situations. Typically, the defendant had entered a guilty plea 
and in some instances had fully or substantially performed his side 
of the bargain before the government revoked some element of its 
plea agreement. 59 Accordingly, it was possible to view the defend­
ant or other action by him constituting detrimental reliance upon the agreement); 
State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 698, 357 A.2d 376, 383 (1976) (state's promise is en­
forceable because defendant substantially performed his part of the bargain); People 
v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 238, 318 N.E.2d 784, 791, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623, 633 (1974), 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975) (state's promise is not enforceable because of 
fraud in the inducement). But see United States ex rei. Selikoff v. Commissioner of 
Correction, 524 F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976) (prin­
ciples of contract law are inapposite to criminal proceedings); State v. Brockman, 277 
Md. 687, 697, 357 A.2d 376, 383 (1976) (the rigid application of contract law to plea 
negotiations would be incongruol'~). 
53. See notes 54-58 infra. 
54. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 66 n.l (1977); Palermo v. Warden, 
Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 294 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 431 U.S. 
911 (1977); United States v. Hammerman, 528 F.2d 326, 331 (4th Cir. 1975). 
55. See Palermo v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 294-95 
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 431 U.S. 911 (1977); United States v. Hammerman, 
528 F.2d 326, 328 (4th Cir. 1975). 
56. See Palmero v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 294-96 
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 431 U.S. 911 (1977); United States v. Hammerman, 
528 F.2d 326, 330 (4th Cir. 1975). 
57. 594 F.2d at 16. 
58. See note 45 supra. 
59. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 259-61 (defendant pled guilty in 
exchange for a promise by the government not to recommend sentence); United 
States v. Bowler, 585 F.2d 851, 852-55 (7th Cir. 1978) (defendant pled guilty and 
cooperated in an investigation); Palermo v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 
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ant's situation as one perfectly analogous to that of a party ag­
grieved by the breach of an express commercial contract or by the 
failure of another to fulfill a promise upon which the performing 
party had relied. 60 
Reliance upon contract law, while providing the courts with 
the means to resolve the problem of broken plea bargains, has 
failed to answer the question left open by Santobello. Contract 
principles do not identifY the source of the constitutional right 
which entitles a defendant to enforcement of a plea bargain. This 
failure illustrates the limits upon which analogies can be drawn 
from contract law. At a certain point, the technical rules of contract 
law fail to provide the court with a basis upon which to enforce a 
constitutional right. The elements of an express contract or of 
promissory estoppel are not present in every plea negotiation. Of­
ten, in the court's perception, when these elements are lacking, 
the defendant has suffered no legal wrong, and he therefore is not 
entitled to relief. The absence of a contract breach, however, does 
not mean that the defendant was not injured in a constitutional 
sense. 
Finding and enforcing a right which lies beyond those pro­
vided by contract law analogy was the precise task facing the 
Fourth Circuit in Cooper. Cooper requested that his constitutional 
right to the offered plea bargain be enforced. Before Cooper ac­
cepted the Government's offer, however, the Government revoked 
the proposal. Thus, in classic contract law a contract was never 
F.2d 286, 289-93 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 431 U.S. 911 (1977) (defendant re­
turned $4,000,000 worth of jewelry in return for a promised reduction in sentence); 
United States v. Hammennan, 528 F.2d 326, 327-30 (4th Cir. 1975) (defendant 
cooperated with the government in return for a promised suspended sentence); 
Harris v. Superintendent, Va. State Penitentiary, 518 F.2d 1173, 1173-74 (4th Cir. 
1975) (defendant pled guilty in exchange for a promised 24-year sentence recom­
mendation); Geisser v. United States, 513 F.2d 862, 863-69 (5th Cir. 1975) (defendant 
supplied infonnation to the government in exchange for a promised maximum sen­
tence and no deportation); United States v. Brown, 500 F.2d 375, 376-77 (4th Cir. 
1974) (defendant pled guilty for a promised sentence recommendation); United 
States v. Ewing, 480 F.2d 1141, 1142-43 (5th Cir. 1973) (defendant pled guilty in re­
turn for a promise of probation); Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944, 946 (1st 
Cir. 1973) (defendant pled guilty in return for a promised sentence recommenda­
tion); United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 426-27 (4th Cir. 1972) (defendant incrim­
inated himself and others in return for a promised misdemeanor charge); State v. 
Kuchenreuther, 218 N.W.2d 621, 623 (Iowa 1974) (defendant testified and returned 
stolen property in exchange for promised immunity and a reduced sentence); State v. 
Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 689-92, 357 A.2d 376, 378-80 (1976) (defendant testified in 
return for a promised sentence reduction). 
60. 594 F.2d at 16. 
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fonned since the offer was withdrawn before it was accepted. 61 Ac­
cordingly, the Fourth Circuit recognized that under contract 
analogies Cooper was not vested with any rights which could be vi­
olated by the government or enforced by the courtS. 62 Further­
more, Cooper could not rely on the defense of promissory estoppel 
because there had been no tangible detrimental reliance by him. 63 
Instead, he had been able to do no more than form the subjective 
intent to accept the offer and experience whatever expectations of 
benefit had been created by anticipation of its fulfillment.64 En­
forcement of a contract on grounds of promissory estoppel requires 
specific reliance and is measured by objective, not subjective, 
standards. 65 
Rather than rely on these contract law doctrines,66 the court 
in Cooper chose to take the case "not one but two steps beyond"67 
any earlier decisions, enforcing the plea bargain despite the fact 
that contract analogies failed. Cooper held that in appropriate cir­
cumstances a constitutional right to enforcement of plea proposals 
may arise before any technical contract has been formed. 68 The 
conclusion in Cooper, that a constitutional right not only existed 
but also had been violated, forced the court to identify the consti­
tutional source of the right. The Fourth Circuit correctly identified 
61. "The power of acceptance created by an ordinary offer is terminated by 
a communicated rejection." A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 94, at 141 (one 
vol. ed. 1952). "An offeree's power of acceptance is terminated by a rejection...." 
D. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 2-23(d), at 80 (2d ed. 
1977). 
62. 594 F.2d at 16. 
63. A "promise may be enforceable by reason of action in reliance upon it. ..." 
A. CORBIN, supra note 61, § 194, at 280. 
64. 594 F.2d at 16. The use of promissory estoppel analogies requires the plea 
bargaining process to have more substantiality than mere expectation and hope. [d. 
at n.5. 
65. [d. 
66. In a situation in which the defendant has not yet entered a guilty plea or 
taken other action constituting detrimental reliance upon the plea bargaining agree­
ment, the government has been allowed to withdraw its offer. See Shields v. State, 
374 A.2d 816, 818-20 (Del.) cen. denied, 434 U.S. 893 (1977); State V. Edwards, 279 
N.W.2d 9, 10 (Iowa 1979); Wynn V. State, 22 Md. App. 165, 172,322 A.2d 564, 568 
(1974); People v. Heiler, 79 Mich. App. 714, 721-22, 262 N.W.2d 890, 895 (1977); 
State ex rei. Gray V. McClure, 242 S.E.2d 704, 707 (W. Va. 1978). 
67. 594 F.2d at 17 n.6. The court expressed this opinion in recognizing that its 
holding was unsupported by its earlier decisions. [d. 
68. [d. at 18. Even though the Fourth Circuit held that its decision was not 
based on contract law, it emphasized that this holding does not deny the utility of 
contract analogies in certain plea bargaining circumstances. The court stated that 
Cooper was only expressing the limits of their utility. [d. at 17. 
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the constitutional grounds alluded to in Santobello,69 naming the 
fifth amendment guarantee of substantive dlle process and the sixth 
amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel as the con­
stitutional source for its decision. 7o 
The fifth amendment declares that no person "shall be de­
prived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."71 
The phrase, "due process of law," while recognized as difficult to 
define accurately, completely, and appropriately under all circum­
stances,72 has come to be interpreted as law in accordance with 
natural, inherent, and fundamental principles of justice. 73 The 
Fourth Circuit stated that the guarantee of due process is so basic 
and plain that it eliminates the need for any explanation or 
discussion. The court noted that the fundamental fairness guaran­
tee of the fifth amendment is so inherently part of the plea bar­
gaining mechanism that any mention beyond identification of the 
constitutional right and source is unwarranted. 74 
The sixth amendment guarantee of effective assistance of coun­
sel was identified as the second source of the constitutional right to 
enforce a plea bargain. 75 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the plea 
bargaining process requires prosecutors to conduct plea negotia­
tions through defense counsel. 76 The government's behavior has a 
tremendous impact on the effectiveness of the defense counsel be­
cause the government's positions and communications necessarily 
69. Id. at 18 n.8. 
70. [d. 
71. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
72. See, e.g., Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37 (1928); 
Green v. Fraizer, 253 U.S. 233, 238 (1920); Twining v. New Jersey, 21 U.S. 78, 
99-100 (1908); Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 255 (1907); Brown v. New Jersey, 175 
U.S. 172, 176 (1899); Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 519 (1885); Ha­
gar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, III U.S. 701, 707 (1884). 
73. The theme that the guarantees of due process reflect traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice prevails throughout the Supreme Court's decisions. 
See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Milliken v. 
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 390 (1898); 
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). 
74. 594 F.2d at 18. 
75. [d. at 18-19. 
76. FED. R. CRIM. P. l1(e)(l). "The attorney for the government and the attor­
ney for the defendant or the defendant when acting pro se may engage in 
discussions with a view toward reaching [a plea bargain] agreement. ..." [d. See 
Anderson v. North Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 930, 935 (W.D.N.C. 1963) (lack of effective 
counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings, in this instance, during the plea negoti­
ations, is constitutionally defective). 
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must be mediated through defendant's counsel. 77 "For this reason, 
not only the credit and integrity of the government but those of his 
counsel are involved in a defendant's perception of the process."78 
Cooper emphasized the importance of effective counsel, de­
claring the defense lawyer to be the essential medium through 
which the demands and commitments of the government are com­
municated to the citizen. 79 Any attempt by the government to 
change or retract a position already communicated to the defendant 
through his counsel would jeopardize the defendant's confidence in 
his lawyer. 80 This would erode the effectiveness of counsel's assist­
ance. 81 Taking these considerations into account, the court stated: 
"[a]t the very least, these Sixth Amendment considerations add a 
heightened degree of obligation to the government's fundamental 
duty to negotiate with scrupulous fairness in seeking guilty pleas. "82 
The court of appeals, identifYing Cooper's constitutional right 
to enforcement of the Government's plea proposal, attempted to 
confine its holding to the narrowest grounds possible. 83' The court, 
limiting its holding by emphasizing the factual elements most cru­
cial to its finding, did not endanger the principles enunciated. 
Rather, examination of Cooper reveals that the case embodied the 
typical set of facts present in the overwhelming majority of plea
84bargaining cases. The factual elements limiting the holding in 
Cooper are not atypical. The court held that a plea proposal must 
be specific and unambiguous and must be made without any reser­
vation related to a superior's approval. The proposal must be rea­
sonable in content and must be made by a prosecutor with appar­
77. FED. R. CRIM, P. ll(e)(I). 
78. 594 F.2d at 18. 
79. Id. The court cited a remark by Justice Stevens of the United States Su­
preme Court concerning the relationships among the defendant, the defense counsel, 
and the Government. Justice Stevens, stressing the importance of effective counsel, 
stated that the participation by an independent professional was of vital importance 
to the accused and to society. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 415 (1977) (concur­
ring opinion). 
80. 594 F.2d at 18. 
81. Id. at 18-19. The court pointed out that this reasoning, although subtle, was 
"certainly familiar to every lawyer who has had to take to his client bad news regard­
ing his settlement negotiations with the other side, particularly when these involve 
unfavorable changes of earlier positions." Id. at 19 n.9. 
82. Id. at 19. 
83. Id. 
84. See notes 52-60 supra and accompanying text for a discussion and examples 
of the typical plea bargaining situation. 
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ent authority. It also must be communicated promptly to the 
defendant so that no question of staleness is involved. The defend­
ant must promptly and unequivocally assent to the proposal. 
Finally, the assent must be made through defendant's counsel, who 
must expediently communicate defendant's acceptance to the gov­
ernment. 85 When a plea proposal embodies these criteria, constitu­
tional fairness requires that the proposal be enforced.86 
The court, cautioning that the right to enforce a plea bargain 
is not limitless,87 enunciated one condition limiting this right. 
When extenuating circumstances that were unknown to and not 
readily discoverable by the government when the proposal was 
made supervene or become known, the plea may be withdrawn. 88 
In other words, once presented, a plea proposal cannot be re­
scinded without sufficient justification.89 If the prosecution, prior 
to the consummation of a plea bargain, learns that the defendant 
has not told the truth, or if evidence comes to light that was previ­
ously unknown, the prosecutor would be justified in withdrawing 
the plea offer. 90 
IV. BEYOND COOPER 
Cooper succeeded in answering the question left open by 
Santobello, naming the fifth and sixth amendments as the source of 
the constitutional right to enforcement of a plea bargain. In doing 
85. 594 F.2d at 19. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. The withdrawal of the plea proposal by the Government in Cooper was 
a result of an objection voiced by a superior with respect to the offer that had 
been made. The court pointed out that this reason does not qualify as an extenuating 
circumstance. Id. But cf. Shields v. State, 374 A.2d 816, 820 (Del.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 893 (1977) (state may withdraw from a plea bargain at any time prior to, but not 
after, the entry of the defendant's guilty plea or other action by him constituting de­
trimental reliance upon the agreement); State v. Edwards, 279 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa 
1979) (state may withdraw from plea bargain prior to guilty plea); State v. Brockman, 
277 Md. 687, 698, 357 A.2d 376, 383-84 (1976) (state may withdraw plea bargain if 
defendant has not to a substantial degree and in a proper manner performed his obli­
gation); Wynn v. State, 22 Md. App. 165, 172, 322 A.2d 564, 568 (1974) (plea bargain 
should not be specifically enforced in the abst:nce of affirmative evidence of preju­
dice); People v. Heiler, 79 Mich. App. 714, 721-22, 262 N.W.2d 890, 895 (1977) (plea 
bargain should not be enforced unless abuse of prosecutorial discretion and resultant 
prejudice to defendant are found); State ex reI. Gray v. McClure, 242 S.E.2d 704, 707 
(W. Va. 1978) (state is not bound to the terms of an inchoate plea agreement if the 
defendant has not yet acted to his detriment). 
90. See note 89 supra and accompanying text. 
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so, Cooper constructed a solid constitutional foundation for the 
right to enforce broken plea agreements. In providing the answer 
to the question left open by Santobello, however, the Fourth Cir­
cuit left three unknowns: First, whether Cooper spells the end of 
the utility of contract analogies in plea bargaining analysis; second, 
whether Cooper inhibits or enhances the plea bargaining process; 
and third, whether Cooper will likely be embraced by other juris­
dictions. 
The Cooper court emphasized that it did not intend to end the 
application of contract principles to plea bargain disputes in all cir­
cumstances. Instead, it merely recognizes the limited use of these 
analogies. 91 By noting these limits, Cooper avoids overextending 
the relative certainties of established common-law analogies in de­
veloping difficult constitutional doctrine. 92 Fear that courts will 
overextend their use of contract law analogies does not require the 
complete elimination of the use of analogies in the plea bargaining 
process. "[A]nalogies from contract law will usually provide a reli­
able inclusive test for the existence of constitutional right and viola­
tion, but not an equally reliable exclusive test."93 Thus, when non­
compliance with a technical contract rule directly impairs a defend­
ant's formal acceptance of an offer, denying him a constitutional 
right to enforce a plea bargain, the contract rule must not, in and 
of itself, determine whether the defendant is entitled to enforce­
ment of this right. 
The second concern arising from the Cooper decision is 
whether the holding will enhance or inhibit the plea bargaining 
process. Cooper, reiterating the language in Santobello, stated that 
a defendant's constitutional rights are confined to the process "rea­
91. 594 F.2d at 17-18. 
92. Id. The Supreme Court has observed that it is necessary to resist the temp­
tation to take common-law analogies too far in developing constitutional doctrine. 
See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 n.8 (1977) (stating that the Court was not 
dealing with notions of offer, acceptance, consideration, or other concepts of the law 
of contracts, but rather with constitutional law); Stoner v. California, 376 US. 483, 
488 (1964) (holding that rights protected by the fourth amendment are not to be 
eroded by strained applications of the law of agency or by unrealistic doctrine of ap­
parent authority); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 513 (1961) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (stating that the Court's concern in determining the reach of the fourth 
amendment should not be with the trivialities of the local law of trespass); Jones v. 
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960), overruled on other grounds, United States v. 
Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980) (cautioning that it was unnecessary and ill-advised to 
integrate into fourth amendment law subtle distinctions of private property law). 
93. 594 F.2d at 17. 
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sonably due" under the circumstances. 94 The limits of reasonable­
ness are found by weighing the practical burdens imposed on the 
government by recognition of the defendant's rights against the 
consequences to the defendant if the rights are not recognized. 95 
Prosecutors have protested that denying the government the 
power to withdraw its offer unless extenuating circumstances ex­
ist96 may severely impede the plea bargaining process. If the pros­
ecution negotiates with the defendant on the premise that once it 
makes an offer it will be bound, the prosecution may be extremely 
reluctant to participate in plea bargaining. Courts have argued that 
binding the prosecutor to plea agreements before the defendant 
has entered a guilty plea or has detrimentally relied upon the 
agreement might inhibit the dispositional use of plea bargaining by 
placing the prosecutor at an absolute disadvantage;97 if defendants 
are free to withdraw from plea agreements prior to entry of their 
guilty plea, regardless of any prejudice to the prosecutor, then the 
government in tum should be provided the right to withdraw. This 
argument, however, ignores the principles of fundamental fairness 
and effective assistance of counsel enunciated in Cooper. Enforcing 
plea agreements does not put the government at an absolute disad­
vantage; instead, the government is only required to act with fair­
ness. 
It is argued that enforcement of the offer, once it is made, 
would eliminate the abusive practice of freely making and with­
drawing plea proposals as a means of testing the will and confi­
dence of the defendant and his counsel. 98 Cooper recognizes that 
failure to find the arbitrary rescission of a plea agreement to be a 
constitutional violation would necessarily give judicial approval to a 
practice which has a clear possibility for abuse. 99 In addition to po­
tential abuse of the plea bargaining process, allowing the prosecu­
tor to rescind his offer might impugn the honor of the government 
and public confidence in the fair and efficient administration of 
justice. 1Oo The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir­
94. Id. at 16. 
95. Id. at 19. 
96. See note 88 supra an accompanying text. 
97. People v. Heiler, 79 Mich. App. 714, 721-22, 262 N.W.2d 890, 895 (1977). 
After the defendant in Heiler agreed to a proposed plea bargain, the prosecutor's of­
fice withdrew the plea offer because the bargain was contrary to the prosecutor's 
charging policy. 
98. 594 F.2d at 20. 
99. Id. 
100. United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972) (government 
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cuit has stated that "fundamental fairness and public confidence in 
government officials require that prosecutors be held to 'meticulous 
standards of both promise and performance.' "101 
The final issue raised by Cooper is whether other courts are 
likely to embrace Cooper's analysis of the plea bargaining process 
when that process is beyond the limits of contract analogies. 
Cooper acknowledges that its decision to enforce the right to a plea 
bargain on constitutional rather than contract grounds takes it "not 
one but two steps beyond"102 any earlier decisions. Cooper un­
mistakenly identifies a constitutional due process right to specific 
performance of a broken plea bargain. Santobello, however, did 
not go that far. loa Though Cooper extended protection to a defend­
ant when he has neither pled guilty nor detrimentally relied on a 
plea agreement, the issue is whether other jurisdictions also will 
extend Santobello in this manner. Two courts104 have specifically 
declined to follow the Cooper extension, and prior to Cooper, 
many states denied enforcement of plea bargain agreements in fac­
tual situations comparable to Cooper. 105 
V. CONCLUSION 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
identified the fifth amendment guarantees of fundamental fairness 
failed to fulfill its promise that the defendant would not be subject to further prose­
cution). See Geisser v. United States, 513 F.2d 862, 863 (5th Cir. 1975) (government 
went back on its word); State v. Kuchenreuther, 218 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Iowa 1974) 
(state breached its promise not to prosecute defendant for a felony). 
101. Palermo v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 296 (2d Cir. 
1976), cerl. dismissed, 431 U.S. 911 (1977) (prosecuting attorney failed to fulfill the 
promise made during plea negotiations). 
102. 594 F.2d at 17 n.6. 
103. 404 U.S. at 261. 
104. "We decline to follow the Cooper rationale." Government of V.I. v. 
Scotland, 614 F.2d 360, 362 (3d Cir. 1980). In Scotland, the plea bargain was 
factually similar to that in Cooper, but the availability of an alternative remedy, the 
withdrawal of the plea by the defendant, caused the court to reject the Cooper rule. 
[d. "We decline to follow Cooper." State v. Edwards, 279 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Iowa 1979). 
In Edwards, the defendant accepted a plea bargain in which his guilty plea to a mis­
demeanor would be exchanged for dismissal of a felony charge. The state, however, 
withdrew the offer before the defendant had an opportunity to enter a guilty plea to 
the misdemeanor. [d. 
105. See Shields v. State, 374 A.2d 816, 820 (Del.), cerl. denied, 434 U.S. 843 
(1977) (plea proposal withdrawn before guilty plea was entered); People v. Heiler, 
79 Mich. App. 714, 721-22,262 N.W.2d 890, 895 (1977) (plea proposal withdrawn be­
fore guilty plea was entered); State ex rei. Gray v. McClure, 242 S.E.2d 704, 707 (W. 
Va. 1978) (plea proposal withdrawn before guilty plea was entered). 
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and substantive due process and the sixth amendment guarantee of 
effective assistance of counsel as the basis for the constitutional 
right to enforcement of a plea bargain. lOS While prior cases have 
granted constitutional protection to plea agreements, Cooper's util­
ization of specific constitutional guarantees without the foundation 
of contract law analogies is extraordinary. Cooper went beyond ex­
isting case law and held that, under appropriate circumstances, a 
constitutional right to enforcement of a plea bargain may arise even 
before any technical contract between prosecution and defendant 
has been formed. l07 In other words, under Cooper, a defendant 
may be able to compel performance of a plea bargain on constitu­
tional grounds even if he has not yet accepted or acted upon the 
agreement. 
The Fourth Circuit's reliance on the fifth and sixth amend­
ments in the plea bargaining context, however, must be scruti­
nized. Dependence on the sixth amendment right to effective 
counsel is suspect in the unconsummated plea bargaining situation. 
Cooper held that any attempt by the government to change or re­
tract a position already communicated to a defendant through his 
attorney would jeopardize the defendant's confidence in his coun­
sel. 108 On its face, this argument appears persuasive. Many events, 
however, may occur during the course of a criminal case which 
might disappoint the defendant. He often may be inclined, rightly 
or wrongly, to blame his attorney for these developments. More 
specifically, in any plea negotiation, even when it does not involve 
the withdrawal of a plea proposal, the possibility exists that a de­
fendant may lose faith in his attorney. For example, the govern­
ment might decide not to offer a plea proposal or might offer only 
one which the defendant considers unfavorable. A defendant's loss 
of faith, without more, however, does not appear to reach the sta­
tus of a constitutional violation. The appropriate focus for de­
termining whether a defendant's right to effective counsel has been 
violated is on defense counsel and his performance, rather than on 
the defendant's perception of defense counsel. 109 
106. 594 F.2d at 18. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 18-19. 
109. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970); United States v. 
Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1120-21 (lst Cir. 1978); United States v. Gray, 565 F.2d 881, 
887 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978); Marzullo V. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 
543-44 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978); Moore V. United States, 
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The Fourth Circuit recognized that its reliance on the sixth 
amendment as a basis for enforcing plea agreements was shallow. 
At the same time, however, the court was not willing to com­
pletely dismiss this rationale, stating that "At the very least, these 
Sixth Amendment considerations add a heightened degree of obli­
gation to the government's fundamental duty to negotiate with 
scrupulous fairness in seeking guilty pleas. "110 By treating the sixth 
amendment merely as supplementary support to its decision, the 
court obviously emphasized that the fifth amendment due process 
guarantees, rather than the sixth amendment guarantees, formed 
the nucleus of its holding. In fact, the concept of fundamental fair­
ness embodied within the substantive guarantees of the fifth 
amendment, standing alone, is sufficient to support enforcement of 
a broken plea bargain. The Cooper court correctly annunciated that 
the denial of fundamental fairness is shocking to the universal 
sense of justice. 111 The Fourth Circuit, citing the Supreme Court's 
decision in Santobello, stated that, at the very least, a criminal de­
fendant who enters into a plea bargain has the right to receive that 
process reasonably due under the circumstances. 112 
The Fourth Circuit further emphasized that its holding is lim­
ited to factually similar plea bargaining situations. 113 This limitation 
suggests that Cooper is an anomaly. This is an erroneous assump­
tion. Despite the uniqueness of the Cooper holding, courts which 
choose to follow Cooper should not be deterred from doing so. The 
plea bargaining process encountered in Cooper is comparable to 
a normal plea negotiation. 114 Subsequently, the facts of Cooper 
should not provide an insurmountable obstacle. 115 A defendant 
432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 
1949), cer!. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950). 
1l0. 594 F.2d at 19. 
llI. See Kinsella v. United States ex reI. Singelton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960). 
"Due process cannot create or enlarge power.... It has to do ... with the denial of 
that 'fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice.' " Id. See also 
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942). "[Due process of law] formulates a concept 
less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in other specific and particular provi­
sions of the Bill of Rights.... [It constitutes] a denial of fundamental fairness, 
shocking to the universal sense of justice." Id. 
112. 594 F.2d at 19. 
113. Id. 
114. See notes 83-90 supra. 
115. See United States v. McIntosh, 612 F.2d 835 (4th Cir. 1979) (Fourth Cir­
cuit declined to follow its holding in Cooper on the basis of distinguishable facts). The 
court stated that McIntosh did not fall within the plea bargain criteria enunciated in 
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who enters into a typical plea bargain with the government is enti­
tled to constitutional relief if the bargain is breached. Under 
Cooper the fifth amendment provides the basis for this relief, 
requiring the government to be held to a standard of fundamental 
fairness. 
Plea bargaining plays a critical role in the criminal justice sys­
tem. As such, it is essential that the plea bargaining process be 
conducted with the highest level of due process protections. At a 
time when confidence in government is waning, government offi­
cials should be held to meticulous standards of both promise and 
performance in order to restore the public's trust. Enforcement of 
broken plea bargains will help to eliminate the abusive practices of 
government attorneys by regulating their prosecutorial discretion. 
Though discretion is a critical part of a prosecutor's decisionmaking 
process, this discretion is not limitless. Discretion must be regu­
lated not only because the liberty of a defendant is at stake, but 
also because the honor of the government and public confidence in 
the fair and efficient administration of justice are at stake. U6 These 
tenets are essential to a full understanding of Cooper's implications. 
Cooper rightly provides an aggrieved defendant with the constitu­
tional right to enforce a broken plea bargain. In doing so, Cooper 
elevates the plea bargaining process "not one but two steps beyond 
... earlier cases."117 As such, the Fourth Circuit's decision is an 
important step toward improving the criminal justice system and 
restoring public confidence in its administration. 
Paul Briggs 
Cooper. The alleged plea proposal in McIntosh was not in fact made and was ambig­
uous. There was no evidence of any actual authority in the state prosecutor to act on 
behalf of the United States, and no substantial evidence from which apparent author­
ity could be found. [d. at 837-38 (Phillips, J., concurring). 
116. United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972). 
117. 594 F.2d at 17 n.6. 
